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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:
RE:

Nancy

May 9, 1978

No. 77-1134, Montana v. United States

L}fof.i," -h

AffirfYI_./
The SG has filed a 13-page ros ~nie, which is a ~
in itself that there may be something here.

The response

addresses the England/collateral estoppel point and the
Supremacy Clause issue on the merits.
1.

England/collateral estoppel.

The SG argues first

that England is inapplicable because the conditions for
imposition of that doctrine are inapplicable.
the SG, those mnditions are:

According to

(1) the federal court has

abstained, (2) the parties asserting the federal claim "freely

2.
and without reservation" submit their federal claims to the
state courts, (3) the parties in both actions are identical,
and (4) the state court has jurisdiction over the parties.
The SG submits that these conditions were not met because
the federal court technically did not abstain, but held its
proceedings in abeyance pending completion of the state court
proceedings in Kiewit; the United States never agreed to submit
its federal claims to the state courts; the state court never
acquired jurisdiction over the United States; and the United
States was not a party to Kiewit.

On the collateral estoppel

point, the SG argues that the deciSion in Kiewit did not decide
the issue here.

According to the SG, xkex«8RX it was not clear

that Kiewit would have to pay any gross receipts tax because
the tax might have been cancelled out by the other tax
credits (personal property and corporate income).

~ ~
~

9
I

I think the SG probably is right about England, but

have-~ut t~

coll_:ter:=, estoppel _:,o int.

I t is

true that the Montana S. Ct. in Kiewit I said that the xaxx
gross receipts tax might end up in a "washout", but in
Kiewit II it seems that the contractor argued that it might
indeed f have to pay a net tax and that therefore the tax
was invalid, because it amounted to a revenue-raising, rather
than a revenue-enforcing, measure. (As noted in the preliminary
memo, the state court rejected this argument in Kiewit II.)
In addition, even if the identical issue was not litigated
in Kiewit I as in the federal proceedings below, the United
States would seem to be bound by the state court determination

3.

that the distinction in the Montana tax between public and
private contractors is not violative of the equal protection
clause.

Whether or not this equal protection determination

is determinative of the discrimination issue under the
Supremacy Clause is an open question, as far as I can tell,
answer to the
but the/collateral estoppel issue is not clear to me.

2.

The Supremacy Clause issue.

The SG's argument, in

essence, is that the gross receipts tax is discriminatory
against the federal government because:(l) The tax applies only
to public contractors, and therefore it is not like the
neutral, across-the-board taxes imposed in cases like
Alabama v. King & Boozer or James v. Dravo Contracting (both
cited in the preliminary memo).

The taxes imposed in those

cases "are imposed equally on all similarly situated constituents--private as well as governmental--in the state.
tax involved here is not."

Motion to Affirm 10.

The

According

to the SG, the omission of private contractors is critical
because if the tax were imposed on private contractors,
there would be constitutents in the state who could protest
to the legislature if the tax became too high.

Here, on the

other hand, the tax applies only to those who deal with
federal
the/government and state and local governments. That brings
me to the SG's second point: (2) Although the tax appears
contractors dealing with
to be neutral because it applies to/state and local entities
as well as the federal government, this is only superficially
the case.

The state can reimburse its contractors for the

4.
taxes (as can the federal government), but with the state,
the money goes from one pocket (the contracting office) to
the other (the tax collector).

The same is not true of the

fedearal government.
While the SG is correct that the ixxHe tax here
is not like the ones upheld,xkexe which applied a«sxx
( across-the-board to

~Hkii£

contractors or lessees dealing

with public and private entities alike, neither is the tax

-

-

as clearly discriminatory as the SG makes it out to be.
The tax applies not only to contractors who deal with the
federal government, but also contractors who deal with
local governments.

These latter governments do not get

back their money the same way the state does, and in that
respect are situated just like the federal government.
aaaixiSR~

XR

Unless they are reimbursed by the state, which

does not appear to be the case, they provide the political
check on the state's taxing power required to sustain the tax.
The SG does not provide an adequate answer to this point.
He merely says, in a footnote:
"The fact that the tax is imposed on receipts from
local governments, school districts and other governmental entities makes no difference, even assuming
that those entities, like the federal government,
cannot recoup those payments occasioned by the tax.
Once it is shown that the State is discriminating
against the federal government, the tax must fall;
its constitutionality cannot be restored by showing
that the state is also discriminating against other
governmental entitities."
Motion to Affirm 10.

This statement begs the question whether

the tax does discriminate against the federal government; and

).

the state maintains that the fact tha·t other governmental
entities also are subject to the tax proves non-discrimination.
The question, then, is whether the added protection
that would be afforded the federal government if the tax also
were imposed on contractors deaing with private entities is
constitutionally required if the tax is not to violate the
Supremacy Clause.
question.

I still think this is a substantial federal

Certainly, for basic equal protection purposes

involving state taxation, the distinction between private
and public contractors would pass constitutional muster.
The question here is whether a higher standard is applicable
when the gsx federal government contends that the failure to
include private contractors in the tax xdemonstrates
discrimination against the federal government.

See preliminary

memo at iix 9-10.
One final word:

the SG relies heavily on United States

v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977), for the proposition
that the tax is invalid because it is not applied across-the-board
to private as well as public contractors.

In County of Fresno,

California imposed a tax on lessees of tax-exempt public
property, and this applied to persons who rented xaxKexx
tax-exempt houses from the National Forest Service.
Court sustained the tax.

The

But the SG argues that the reason

the Court sustained the tax was because it corresponded to
the tax imposed on the owners of private property (which was
not tax-exempt), which presumbably was reflected in the rent
Sec. 'ia1 u.s. ~i, 'I~~ .
paid by these private lessees.
G therefore reasons that
this other tax provided the "political check against abuse"

required by the Supremacy Clause. (Xn · addition, I note that
Tyler recommended to you in his bench memo that the tax
was oNay in part because it represented an attempt to
even up the relative positions of those renting from owners
of tax-exempt property and those renting from owners of
taxed property.)

Here, on the other ak hand, private

contracoors are totally excluded from the tax.
While County of Fresno thus is instructive, I do not
think it is dispositive of this case for several reasons.----For what it's warth, that case involved taxing federal
employees' possessory interest in federal property, k whereas
this involves a direct tax on the gross receipts of the
contracoor himself.

But because the tax is on the work the

contracoor does for the federal government, and because in
many instances the government will reimburse the taxp?yer,
I doubt that that makes a constitutional difference.

The

more important distinction between the cases is that here
at least the tax is imposed on la£al contractors who do
business with local governments as well as those who do
business with the state and the federal government.

That

may be sufficient to make the tax nondiscriminatory, but I
am not sure.

Contrary to appellants' coneantions and the

opinim of the dissenting judge below, however, it seems to
me likely that if the tax weee imposed only on those who do
business with the state and the federal governments, the
tax probably would violate the Supremacy Clause.
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1.

SUMMARY:

The main question presented by this

appeal is whether a state-imposed gross receipts tax on
contractors who perform work for public bodies, including
the federal government, is unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause.

Subordinate issues are whether

imposition of a tax on public contractors but not private
contractors violates the equal protection clause, and

~.

whether the federal three-judge court was precluded from
considering these issues because of a prior state court
adjudication.
2.

FACTS:

Appellants are the State of Montana,

the Montana Dep't of Revenue, and the Department's Director
(all hereinafter referred to as Montana or appellants).
Montana imposes a tax of 1% on gross receipts of public

-

contractors, which are defined to be construction
contractors performing work for any public body, including
the State, any of its political subdivisions or special
purpose districts, and the federal government.

It appears

that the tax originally was conceived as a "revenue
enforcing", rather than as a "revenue raising" measure.
The gross receipts tax would be collected from public
contractors and held, sort of as security, for the
contractor's personal property and corporate income taxes
that eventually would become due.

The contractor receives

a refund or credit toward the personal property and
corporate income taxes.

The State apparently keeps

whatever is left over, however, and so the tax acts in part
as a revenue raising measure.
This litigation began in state court when the
federal government, on behalf of the Army Corps of
Engineers, directed one of its contractors (Kiewit) to
challenge the Montana tax on equal protection and supremacy
clause grounds.

Kiewit brought suit in state court.

suit was controlled and financed by the federal

------------------~

~-----------------~

The

3.

government.

Kiewit lost in state court.

Kiewit Sons, Inc.

v. State Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140 (1973)
(Kiewit I)

(contained in the J.S. App. 105-123).

The

Montana S. Ct. rejected all the challenges to the tax law.
The following holdings are relevant to this case:

(1)

The

distinction between private contractors, who are not
subject to the tax, and public contractors, who are, is not
irrational under the equal protection clause in view of the
wide latitude given the states in enacting taxing
statutes.

(The reasons given by the state court for the

distinction did not seem to have anything to do with
taxation; they seemed to be related more to the need for
licensing and regulation of contractors who perform work
for public bodies.)

(2)

The tax is not an

unconstitutional discrimination against the federal
government because contractors who deal with the federal
government are not treated less favorably than contractors
who deal with the State.

(3)

The impact of the tax on the

federal government is not direct or substantial.

All of

these rulings added up to the conclusion that the tax is
not unconstitutional under this Court's precedents.
In Kiewit Sons, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 531
P.2d 1327 (1975)

(Kiewit II)

(contained in J.S. App.

124-30), the Montana S. Ct. rejected Kiewit's contention
that the statute was invalid when used as a
revenue-producing measure instead of a revenue-enforcing
measure.

3.

During the pendency of these state court
proceedings, an action that had been filed by the federal
government to challenge the tax was continued pursuant · to ~~
the parties'

agreement ~e;

Kiewit I and--Kiewit II,

the ~

majority of the three-judge court below ruled that the tax
is invalid under the Supremacy Clause.

First, it rejected

Montana's contention that relitigation of the
constitutionality of the tax was barred by res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the rule of England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (holding that
a party that submits its federal claims for decisions by a
state court, without reservation, forgoes the right to
return to dist ct even if it did not seek review of the
state court decision in this Court) .
On the merits, and in a fairly confusing opinion,
the majority held that the tax violates the Supremacy
Clause by discriminating against the federal government and
in favor of the state.

The supposed discrimination occurs

because although contractors who work for both the State
and the federal government have to pay the tax, and thereby
the cost to the contracting government is made higher, the
State gets its money back in the form of general revenues
while the federal government does not.
While first stating that its resolution of the
Supremacy Clause issue made it unnecessary to pass upon the
question whether the equal protection clause prohibits the
State's discrimination between public and private

contractors, the court went on to state its views on the
issue anyway.

First it stated that it was not barred by

collateral estoppel from reaching the issue, despite the
prior resolution of the question by the Montana S. Ct.
majority explained:

The

"[N]othing in the issues presented,

nor did the contractor Kiewit have standing to raise on
behalf of the Government in Kiewit, the Government's
current issue of the discriminatory effect upon it as an
owner-builder by the imposition of [the tax] upon its
[c]ontractors in violation of the Supremacy Clause."
App. 15.

J.S.

On the merits of this issue the court concluded

that "as between [public contractors] and large structure
private contractors, there is no reasonable or rational
factual basis for the demonstrated unequal treatment under
the Act."

Id. 16.

Apparently by reading the equal

protection clause together with the Supremacy Clause, the
majority concluded that "the imposition of the [gross
receipts] tax upon [public contractors] discriminates
against the Government in favor of private contractors, all
in violation of the Supremacy Clause."

Id. 17.

Judge Kilkenny dissented on every point.

He

believed these issues to have been determined conclusively
by the prior state court adjudication.

The United States

admitted the following facts indicating that it had control
over the lawsuit:

the federal government required Kiewit

to file the lawsuit; reviewed and approved the complaint;
paid the attorneys fees; directed the appeal to the Montana

b.

s.

Ct.; participated as amicus curiae before that court;

was the real party in interest; directed the filing of a
notice of appeal to this Court; and, through the SG,
abandoned its appeal here.

In view of these facts, Judge

Kilkenny believed that the federal government had the
"laboring oar" in the state court proceeding and therefore
should be bound by it.

Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S.

316, 318.
On the merits, he suggested that the majority's
decision sub silentio overruled a whole line of this
Court's cases allowing States to impose gross receipts
taxes on contractors even when they worked for the federal
government.

See,~.,

Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S.

1; James v. Dravo Contracting, 302 U.S. 134.

The

majority's reasoning--that this was discrimination against
the federal government and in favor of the

State~

simply

because the State got back its contracting money in the
form of general revenues--would apply to every tax on
contractors' gross receipts because the same work performed
for the federal government would not be as expensive when
performed for the State.

The majority's reasoning distorts

the proper test, as set out in Phillips Chemical Co. v.
Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, that the State must treat
those who deal with the federal government as well as it
treats those with whom it deals itself.

Id., at 385.

Here

that test was met because the tax itself is identical as
applied to contractors working for the federal government

7.

and contractors working for the State.

The only difference

is in the impact on the sovereign,. and 'at that point there
is no Supremacy Clause violation because the tax itself is
the same regardless of whether the sovereign is the State
or the federal government, and any economic effect on the
federal government is neither direct nor substantial.
On the issue concerning the difference in
treatment of public and private contractors, Judge Kilkenny
concluded that the issue had been decided in the State's
favor in Kiewit I and that, in any event, the majority's
resolution of the question was wrong.

The States have wide

latitude in drawing distinctions for purposes of taxation;
the fact that the Supremacy Clause is implicated does not
change that standard of review.

Rather, the federal

government's interest "must be weighed in the balance to
ascertain whether the state treats similarly-situated
constituents in a similar fashion.

[T]his condition

is satisfied here in that all contractors are subject to
the same exact tax."
3.

J.S. App. 33.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellants attack the reasoning

of the majority on each of the above points, including
whether the dist ct was precluded from considering these
questions.

On the merits, appellants contend that the

lower court majority has completely misinterpreted Phillips
Chemical.

In concluding that the tax is discriminatory

because the State gets its payment back in the

for~

of

general revenue, the lower court implicitly overruled many

8.

of this Court's cases upholding state taxes on contractors
working for the federal government.
J.S. 15.

S~e

cases cited at

(Appellants also note that while the State ·itself

will get its money back, the same will not be true of
political subdivisions and other units that hire public
contractors.)

According to appellants,

Ph~llips

Chemical

simply requires that the tax applied to contractors dealing
with the federal government be the same as the tax applied
to contractors dealing with the State.

(In Phillips the

tax itself was different as applied to property leased by
the federal government or the State.)

The fact that the

tax here distinguishes between public and private
contractors only is relevant to the equal protection
question.
Appellants' position, in sum, is:
"A tax must pass two separate 'discrimination'
tests. As with any tax the classification between
those who actually pay the tax and those who are
excluded must be non-discriminatory under equal
protection standards. And where a tax also has
some inter-sovereign overtones, the tax must also
be non-discriminatory in that it treats those
taxpayers who deal with the Federal Government as
well as it treats those who deal with the State."
J.S. 18.

The lower court majority has "greatly confused

the law • . • by holding that a Supremacy test must be made
not only of the relationship created by the taxing act
between the two sovereigns but also that a Supremacy test
(rather than an Equal Protection test) is also made of the
actual classification for tax purposes between those taxed
and those exempt."

J.S. 20.

9.

Appellants' arguments are echoed in two amicus
briefs--one from California and one filed jointly by
Virginia, Arizona, North Dakota, Alaska, Nebraska,
Maryland, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Alabama, Wyoming, Guam,
Washington, Arkansas, Florida, West Virginia, Iowa, Idaho,
New Mexico, Indiana, Puerto Rico, and Colorado.

They are

all very upset with the decision below.
4.

DISCUSSION:

States who are

~mici,

In view of the reaction of the

the opinion of the dissenting judge,

the lack of coherence in the decision below, and the
apparent departure from this Court's precedents, it would

__

-

be hard ....,'--"""
to say that there is not a substantial federal
question here. This clearly is not a case like Phillips

-----........ .

Chemical, where the tax itself differed depending on
whether the federal government or the State was involved.
The only way to say that there is discrimination ·here is to
focus on the fact that when the State pays a contractor a
higher price because of the contractor's tax liability, it
gets back the extra funds through the tax, while the
federal government does not.

But appellants, the amici,

and the dissenting judge seem to be right that this would )
I ( pvblic. ar,d pri vafe /
1
be true with any tax levied on all contractor1
This latter point may be what impelled the court
below to examine the exemption of private contractors from
the tax; for the exemption makes this tax look like more
like the tax in Phillips Chemical, which applied only to
those who dealt with the federal government and the State,

10.

yet the State got its money back.

The court below may have

been attempting to see whether the tax . structure really is
a facade for discriminating against contractors who deal
with the federal government.

But there is much to what

appellants say about the confusion ]n the decision below of
the equal protection and Supremacy Clause tests.

In

addition, political subdivisions of the State receive the
same tax treatment as the federal government.
I would call for a response from the SG.

There is

no response.
Bregstein

Opns in petn

19 ...

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned

Suhmitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .
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BENCH ' MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

Montana

· v~

·united ·states, No. 77-1134

summary
This case arises out of a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Montana Contractors' Gross Receipts
Tax Act (the Act).

The Act levies a 1% tax on the gross

-----

receipts from "public contracts," defined to include all
-....__
______.....
'--..
contracts for public construction work in the State with the
State of Montana, its subdivisions, and the United States.

---- ----

,,

,,The

Act imposes no tax on gross receipts from private contracts,
i~e~,

contracts with private Purchasers of construction work.

The Act provides for refunds and credits of the gross receipts
tax, based on the payment of Montana personal property tax,
personal income tax, and corporate license tax.

These refunds

and credits reduce the effective rate of the gross receipts tax
to one half of 1%.
The Act also establishes a system for licensing and
regulation of contractors who enter into public contracts.
Though in the following discussion I will use the
terms "public contractor" and "private contractor" for facility
of expression, it should be borne in mind that a contractor may
perform both public and private contracts.

The gross receipts

-----------------

tax is levied on the receipts from all public contracts.

~~t qu~resent~by

this case is whether

the United States is precluded from litigating its claim that
the Act is unconstitutional.

The answer to this question turns

on the effect to be given to a prior iudgment of the Montana
Supreme Court.

This question is discussed in Part I.

If the United States is not precluded from bringing
this action, then the Court must reach the merits of its claim
that the Act is unconstitutional.

This claim, as presented by

the SG, rests on the Supremacy Clause alone, though an equal
protection challenge to the Act has been mentioned at various
stages of this litigation and the prior state court litigation.
The constitutionality of the Act is discussed in Part II.

I •

Th~

R~s · JudiCata

ISSU~

By stipulation of

DC were continued pending the decision of another case rai ~
similar issues in the Montana Supreme
St~

Bd~

Court,~ t · so2i)v~~

· of Equalization, 505 P.2d 102 (1973)

("K~w~it

I,

reprinted at pp. 105-23 of the Appendix to the Jurisdictional
Statement).

The complaint in the DC was filed less than a

month after the filing of the complaint in

K~w~it · I.

The State

maintains that the two complaints raised the same
constitutional issues, that the United States controlled the
litigation in

K~w~it

I, and that the United States submitted

its constitutional claims unreservedly in that case and had
them determined.

Accordingly, the State contends, the United

States was barred from relitigatinq its constitutional claims
in the DC, under the rule laid down in
M~dical

Examin~rs,

375

u.s.

Enqland · v~

· Louisiana

411 (1964).

The State also contends that even if England does not
apply, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the United
States from relitigating in the present action those specific
issues that were decided in

K~w~it · I.

Unfortunately, the State

does not define with any precision what it thinks those issues
were.

From its citations to the

K~w~it · r

decision, I would

judqe that the State claims that the Montana court ruled on the
claim that the Act discriminates unlawfully between the United
States and private purchasers of contractors' services.

(See

discussion of Equal Protection claim, infra.)

Referring to the

same passage in the opinion of the Montana court, the State
also contends that the court ruled on the claim that the
distinction drawn between public and private contractors is
unlawful.

(See discussion of Equal Protection claim, infra.)

Finally, without referring to any part of the State court
decision, the State maintains that the Supremacy Clause claim
was also determined adversely to the United States.
The SG contends that the Enqland doctrine is
inapplicable to this case.

He argues that Enqland governs only

where
"(1) the federal court abstains and
sends the parties to state court for a
resolution of state law grounds, (2)
those parties 'freely and without
reservation' litigate all their claims
in the state courts, (3) the parties in
the federal and state courts are
identical, and (4) the state court has
competent jurisdiciton over the
parties."
According to the SG, these conditions were not met in the
present case.
First, the DC did not invoke the doctrine of
abstention; rather, the parties stipulated to a continuance.
And the stipulation merely recites that the action is continued
pending the resolution of Keweit I.

-

Second, the SG insists

that the United States was not a party to the Keweit · r ac ion,
and therefore is not bound by the judgment in that case.

\

U. 5.~~
~k
~~56The SG responds to the State's collateral estoppel
claim by contending that the facts in this case and
are significantly different.

~

Keweit ~~

There a particular contract

~

between the United States and a contractor was considered; a
provision of that contract forbade the contractor to claim the
credits and refunds available against the gross receipts tax.
That provision is no longer included in public contracts let by
the United States, according to the SG.

The SG also claims

that the facts in Keweit · r were significantly different because
the contractor's large inventory of equipment in Montana led
the Montana court to assume that all of the gross receipts tax
would be refunded or credited to the contractor on account of
other taxes paid.

In contrast, according to the SG, the record

in the present case establishes that taken overall, the
effective rate of taxation on contracts let by the United
States will be one-half of 1 % of the gross receipts of the
contractor.
The Enqland doctrine is nothing more than the
application of standard res judicata rules in the context of
..........

~

abstention.

If a party is sent to state court by an abstaining
~··

federal court, and once there elects to litigate all of his
claims and have them determined by the State court, then that
party may not avoid an adverse determination of his federal
claims.

In particular, he cannot relitigate those claims in

the federal court.

Enqland, 375

u.s.

at 418-19.

In the

present case, since there was no abstention, it would only be
confusing to invoke the England rule; simple application of the
rules of res judicata will fit the situation more precisely.
The United States controlled the litigation in Keweit

!'

and was the real party in interest in that litigation.

In

~~------------------------------

response to the State's request for admissions in the DC, the
United States admitted that it required Keweit to file the suit
in state court, that it reviewed and approved the complaint,
that it paid the attorneys' fees and costs, that it directed
the appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, that it was the real
party in interest, that it directed the filing of a notice of
appeal to this Court, and that the appeal to this Court was
aborted at the instance of the SG.
It is next necessary to consider whether the United
States should be considered to have pursued the same cause of
action in Keweit · r as it now pursues in the present action.
The complaint in Keweit · I sought a declaration that the hct is
unconstitutional, and a refund of taxes paid by Keweit under
the Act.

In particular, it alleged that the Act discriminates

illegally against the United States and those with whom it does
business, in violation of the rights to due process and equal
protection; that the Act discriminates against public
contractors because no tax is imposed on private contractors;
and that the Act "illegally violate[sl the immunity of the
Federal Government and its instruments (including [Keweit])

U-~r tA---~
~ ~-<~--c..<:-':( c::z.<..-~

~ ~ £iiEe;;F-~~-<..4..,
'---~~u-1

from state control in the performance of t l'}.ei r _Lunctions".

..~-__,

~'1_.5~ r-;c.- ...

In the DC, the amended complaint sought a declaration
that the Act is unconstitutional, an injunction against its
enforcement, and a refund of all net proceeds of the gross
receipts tax received by the State from contractors doing
business with the United States.

The complaint alleged that

the Act is unconstitutional because it discriminates against
the United States in violation of the Supremacy Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment; because it discriminates between public
and private contractors; and because it discriminates between

•

the United States and private purchasers of contracting
services.
The gravamen of both the state court suit and the suit
in the DC was the prayer that the Act be declared
--------------~----------

--

unconstitutional, and that appropriate refunds be paid.

It is

true that in the DC action, the United States sought refund of
all net proceeds of the gross receipts taxes paid by its
contractors, while in the state court action it sought only the
taxes paid by Keweit.

And in the state court action, the

United States did not seek an injunction against enforcement of
the Act.
Despite these differences, it seems to me that it
would be sensible to conclude that the United States is

..

asserting the same cause of actio here that it asserted in
-----~=
Keweit I. The claim asserted by the United States in both

-----

actions was its right to be free of the Act because of the
Act's repugnance to the Constitution.

A holding in Keweit I

that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to public contracts
of the United States would have resulted in refunds of all
taxes paid by contractors on business done with the United
States, and not just refunds of Keweit's taxes.

Further, it is

up to a plaintiff to claim all damages due under a given cause
of action in a single lawsuit.
Nor do I think that there are any differences in the
facts in the two cases that would support the conclusion that
the United States is asserting a separate cause of action.
Contrary to the SG's assertion, the State court did not
conclude that Keweit's other tax payments would fully offset
its qross receipts tax.

This seems clear from the court's

opinion, and was stated explicitly in the court's decision in
Keweit . II. 1

It is true,

1. Some six months after the decision in Keweit · I, Keweit
filed another complaint.
It alleged that 1n Keweit I, the
court had decided that the gross receipts tax is constitutional
only if it results in no net revenue for the State.
Keweit
claimed that since it had become obvious that the qross
receipts tax did produce net revenue for the State, the Act
should be declared unconstitutional.
In Keweit II, the court rejected this suggestion,
commenting tfiat KeweTt had read its first opinion "much too
narrowly." The court agreed with the trial court that the
second action was barred by "doctrines of res iudicata,
collateral estoppel or stare decisis." The opinion in Keweit
II is reprinted at pp. 124-30 of the App. to the Juris.
"Statement.

as the SG states, that the Montana court noticed the clause in
Keweit's contract with the United States that barred Keweit
from taking advantage of the refunds and credits available
against the gross receipts tax.

The Uniten States has since

begun to allow its contractors to use the available offsets.
This difference in the facts, however, seems to me to cut
against the SG's claim that Keweit I should not be controlling
. •.
here.
Since Keweit's contractual incapacity to take advantage
of these offsets increased the effective net rate of taxation
to the full one percent, it further exacerbated the unequal
treatment of which the United States complains.

Therefore, any

differences in the facts in Keweit I would seem to have made it
a stronger case for the United States than the present one.
One additional aspect of the doctrine of res judicata
(and collateral estoppel) should be noticed.

An action for a

declaration of the unconstitutionality of a state statute that
fails at one time may well succeed at a later time if there are
intervening changes in this Court's construction of the
relevant constitutional provisions.

This possibility should be

taken into account in fashioning the rule of res judicata to
govern the government's prosecution of successive actions aimed
at voiding the same state statute.
presented in

comm'r · v~

sunnen, 333

An analogous problem was

u.s.

591

(1948).

In that case, T had entered into several contracts to
license the use of patents that he held.

Under each contract

l

the licensee agreed to pay royalties.

One of the contracts was

entered into in 1928: others, identical in all important
respects, were entered into later.
his wife as a gift.

!

I

assigned the contracts to

The Comm'r brought an action before the

Board of Tax Appeals claiming that the income from the 1928
contract for 1929-1931 was taxable toT: the BTA decided
against the Comm'r in 1935.

In a subsequent proceeding, the

Comm'r made the same claim with respect to the income from all
of the contracts for the years 1937-1941.

Except with respect

to the 1928 contract, the Court refused to hold that the Comm's
was bound by the prior decision of the BTA.

The Court stated

that the principle of collateral estoppel "is designed to
prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been
decided and which have remained substantially static, factually
and legally."

Id., at 599.

Changes in the applicable legal

rules made by decisions of the Court in the years between the
Comm'r's two suits, the Court held, precluded barring the
Comm'r from pursuing his claim in the second suit.
The SG does not suggest, however, that there were any
significant changes in the law of immunity under the Supremacy
Clause, or in the relevant Equal Protection doctrines, between
the the decisions of the Montana court in the Keweit cases and
the decision of the DC in the present case.

The only basis for

such a claim would be the decision of this court in united
states · v~

· county · of Fresno, 429 u.s. 452 (1977).

I discuss the

Fresno case infra, in reviewing the merits of the claim that
the Act is unconstitutional; as you will see from that
discussion, I do not regard Fresno as working any significant
change in the law of immunity under the Supremacy Clause.
Under traditional notions of res judicata, the
assertion by the United States of the same cause of action in
the state court that it now asserts in this case would bar its
relitigation of that cause of action.

This would be true even

if the United States supported its claim in the DC with
theories of the unconstitutionality of the Act that it did not
present to the Montana court in Keweit · r.

It also appears,

however, that the United States presented not only the same
cause of action but also the same theories of
unconstitutionality in the Montana court.
The Montana court first treated the Keweit · r case as
raising equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court concluded that there was no constitutional impediment
to imoosing a tax on the gross receipts of public contracts but
not on the gross receipts of private contracts.
at 117-18.

App. to J.S.,

Its reasoning appears to have been that since the

State has good reason to license and regulate contractors in
their dealings with public bodies, it is fair to tax those
dealings differently than purely private dealings.

As to "the

second half of the discrimination question raised by [Keweit] ,"
the court concluded that the tax does not discriminate against

the United States in favor of private customers of construction
contractors.

The Court reasoned that the United States was

subjected to the same treatment in this regard as the State and
its political subdivisions, and that this satisfied the
constitutional requirement of equal treatment.
It appears that Keweit and the United States also
raised two Supremacy Clause issues. The first one is quite
different from that raised in the present case.

They argued

that the sections of the Act providing for the licensing of
public contractors interfered with the functions of the Federal
government by giving the State a power of review over whether
or not a contractor is eligible to do business with the United
States.

But they also argued, according to the Montana court,

that "this Act violates the immunity of the federal government
from taxation or the economic impact of taxation."

The court

rejected that claim, relying on the authority of James
construction · co~,

302

u.s.

v~

Dravo

134 (1937), for the proposition that

a state may tax an independent contractor for the privilege of
doing work within the state, even if that work is done under
contract to the United States.

App. to J.S., pp. 122-23.

The

court concluded that the gross receipts tax "was not aimed at
nor does it impede the federal government in performing its
functions. If there is any burden on the federal government, it
is indirect and not substantial."
On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that a

strong argument can be made for the position that the United
States is precluded at this time from relitigating the
constitutionality of the Act in federal court.

In the

following discussion, I assume that the United States is not
barred, and consider the merits of its claim that the Act is
unconstitutional.
~

II.

The -constitutionality of · the Act

/L_S.

L..-._/

~~4~

~
By a 2-to-1 vote, the three-judge district court held
that the Act violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
r--'

-

The DC based this holding on the conclusion that the Act
discriminates against the United States in two ways.

First,

though contractors dealing with the State and the Federal
Government are subject to the tax, and accordingly incorporate
the amount of the tax into their bids, the State recoups the
net tax paid as general revenue.

Thus, the State pays an

effective price lower than that paid by the Federal Government
for the same work.

This discrimination against the Federal

Government in favor of the State the DC held to violate the
Supremacy Clause.

Second, the DC concluded that that Act

discriminates against the Federal Government in favor of
Private purchasers of construction services, because
contractors working for the latter are exempted from the gross
receipts tax.
Because it held that the Act violates the Supremacy

Clause, the DC declined to consider the additional argument
that it violates the Equal Protection Clause.

For the same

reason, it did not consider the related claim that the Equal
Protection issue is foreclosed by the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court in the Keweit cases.

A.

suoremacy ·clause ·rssue.

The SG argues that the exemption of private
contractors from the payment of the gross receipts tax is the
crucial factor in rendering the tax unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause.

His argument in this respect has two

distinct themes.
~

The first is that the tax puts contractors who deal
with the Federal Government in a worse position tha
contractors.

This constitutes, according to the SG,

"discrimination in favor of private parties at the expense of
the United States and those with whom it deals."

The SG

contends that the Supremacy Clause requires that the tax be
imposed "evenhandedly" on all contractors in the State.
The SG's second theme rests on what he perceives to be

-----------

the policy underlying the Supremacy Clause law on tax
~

immunities of the Federal Government.

The Federal Government

and those with whom it deals can be protected from the abuse of
oppressive taxation only if the taxes to which they are
subjected are also imposed upon some additional group of
persons and entities that will provide a political check on the

rate of taxation.

In the present case, the SG contends, there

is no political check on the gross receipts tax.

To the extent

that public contractors dealing with the State charge the State
a higher price because of higher gross receipts taxes, the
State recovers the increment in receipt of the tax.

Thus, it

is a matter of indifference to the State and its contractors at
what level the gross receipts tax is set.

Private contractors

and their customers are likewise indifferent to the level of
the tax.

The only real transfer of wealth under the gross

receipts tax is from the Federal Government to the State.
The SG acknowledges that one of the difficulties with
his second argument is the finding of the DC that the
subdivisions of the State are placed in precisely the same
position as is the Federal Government.

They do not recover any

of the gross receipts tax paid by their contractors, so that
the level of the gross receipts tax is of considerable concern
to them.

Presumably, it therefore becomes a concern to the

taxpayers of those subdivisions, or at least of those
subdivisions that do not receive contributions from the State
in excess of any transfer to the State occurring through the
operation of the gross receipts tax.

The SG's treatment of

this point begs the question entirely:
"Once it is shown that the tax
discriminates against the federal
government by favoring similarly
situated constituents within the state,
the tax must fail: its
constitutionality cannot be restored by

'~L--.~

tvv~~~
a-z_ ~ ~ ~-h-,
showing that the state also
discriminates aqainst other
governmental entities."
The State, in contrast to the SG, addresses both of
the aspects of "discrimination" found by the DC.

With respect

to the discrimination between the State and Federal Governments
attributable to the receipt of the tax by the State but not the
Federal Government, the State argues that the DC's decision has
sweeping and untoward effects.

Any tax levied by the State and

paid both by persons doinq business with the State and by
persons doing business with the Federal Government will have
the effect that the DC found objectionable.

Despite this

effect, the State points out, this Court has approved such
State taxes repeatedly.
..._.

302

u.s.

134 (1937)

James · v~

·Dravo ·construction

Co~,

(tax on gross receipts of construction

contractors): Alabama
(sales tax): United

E~q~,

.

v~

·Kinq · &·Boozer, 314

States · v~

Boyd, 378

u.s.

u.s.

1 (1941)

39 (1964)

(use tax

on property owned by state or federal government but used by
independent contractors).

The State argues that the relevant

test regarding discrimination between the State and the Federal
Government is not whether the net economic effect of a state
tax is the same for the State and the Federal Government -- it
can never be the same -- but rather whether those dealing with
the State government are treated in the same way as those
dealing with the Federal Government.

Phillips · chemical · co~ · v~

76 (1960).

Here, as the State

points out, all public contractors are subject to the same tax.
It is this first aspect of the DC's holding -discrimination in favor of the State based on receipt of the
tax by the State -- that has so alarmed the numerous States
that have filed briefs as amici · curiae.
With respect to the exemption of private contractors
from the gross receipts tax and the consequent exposure of the
federal government to oppressive taxation, the State points out
the exposure of political subdivisions and their taxpayers to
the same treatment.

Seep. 15

~upra.

The State also rejects

as simplistic the SG's "two-pocket" conception of State taxing
and expenditures.

The State insists that its taxing and

purchasing decisions are separated one from the other, so that
it is misleading to imagine that it makes no difference to the
State that a high gross receipts tax is reflected in the price
it pays for the services of contractors.
I think that the State is correct with regard to the
discrimination that the DC perceived in the receipt of the tax
by the State.

All State taxes have the effect that the DC

found objectionable, and it is at least clear that this Court
since James

v~

Dravo · construction

Co~,

supra, has not

invalidated State taxes just because the Federal Government may
bear the ultimate burden of the tax.
The effect of the exemption of orivate contractors on
the constitutionality of the Act is a more difficult question,

perhaps best put into perspective by a brief historical note.
For many years the Court read the decision in M'Culloch
~aryland

v~

to forbid state taxes on those with contractual

relationships with the Federal Government if the effect of the
tax was or might be to increase the cost to the Federal
Government of performinq its functions.
however, with the decision in James

v~

Beginning around 1937,
Co~,

Dravo · construction

the Court moved away from this broad Suoremacy Clause immunity
for the Federal Government and those dealing with it.

There is

much in the subsequent decisions that reflects the confusion
and uncertainty of the Court in developing some new principle
to delineate the authority of the States to lay taxes that
affect the United States.
County of · Fresno, 429

u.s.

The decision in United States

v~

452 (1977), appears to me to have

been an attempt to synthesize and state with precision the new
standard as it had been developed in the forty years since
Jarnes · v~ · oravo · construction · co~

At issue in Fresno was the constitutionality of a
California statute levying a tax on the possessory interest of
individuals in improvements on tax-exempt land.

Under this

statute, the County of Fresno imposed a tax on the use by
United States Forest Service employees of houses supplied to
them by the United States.
I

The Court began its consideration

of the constitutionality of the statute by reviewing the
Supremacy Clause basis for the Federal Government's immunity

from State taxation, as set forth in M'Culloch

v~

·Maryland.

In M'Culloch, the Court noted that the power to tax
the national bank could be use to destroy the bank, effectively
repealing the federal law creating the bank.

Since the federal

law is the "supreme law of the land," the Court reasoned, such
a de facto repeal would be unconstitutional.

The State

suggested that even so, the tax that it had levied would not
destroy the bank, but the Court rejected that suggestion.
"If the State's poweer to tax the bank
were recognized in principle, the Court
doubted the ability of federal courts
to review each exercise of such power
to determine whether the tax would or
would not destroy a federal function."
Fresno, 429

u.s.

at 458.

The Court also rejected the argument

that iust as the State will not abuse its power to tax its own
citizens, it will not impose oppressive taxes on a federal
function.
"A State's constituents can be relied
on to vote out of office any
legislature that imposes an abusively
high tax on them.
They cannot be
relied upon to be similarly motivated
when the tax is instead solely on a
federal function."
Id., at 458-59.

Because the Court thought this distinction

between the political checks on the two types of taxes so
significant, it limited its holding by stating that it did not
extend to a tax "imposed on the interest which the citizens of
Maryland may hold in this institution [the bank], in common
with other property of the same description throughout the

State."

4 Wheat., at 436.

The Court in Fresno noted that M'Culloch has been and continues
to be understood to preclude State taxes levied directly on the
Federal Government, or with a legal incidence on the Federal
Government.

But it also noted that "decisions of this Court

since M'Culloch have been less uniform on the question whether
taxes, the economic but not the leqal incidence of which falls
in part or in full on the Federal Government, are invalid."
After reviewing the decisions since
Co~,

James · v~

Dravo Construction

the Court formulated the following rule.
"The rule to be derived from the
Court's more recent decisions, then, is
that the economic burden on a federal
function of a state tax imposed on
those who deal with the Federal
Government does not render the tax
unconstitutional so long as the tax is
imposed equally on the other similarly
situated constituents of the State.
This rule returns to the original
intent of M'Culloch · v~ Maryland.
The
political checK*against a5use of the
taxing power found lacking in
M'Culloch, where the tax was imposed
solely on the Bank of the United
States, is present where the State
imposes a nondiscriminatory tax only on
its constituents or their artificially
owned entities:11 ••.•
-rr-:--.Atax-on-tFie1ncome of federal
employees, or a tax on the possessory
interest of federal employees in
Government houses, if imposed only on
them, could be escalated by a State so
as to destroy the federal function
performed by them either by making the
Federal Government unable to hire
anyone or by causing the Federal
Government to pay prohibitively hiqht

salaries. This danger would never
arise, however, if the tax is also
imposed on the income and property
interests of all other residents and
voters of the State."
Fresno, 429

u.s.,

at 462-63.

The Court applied its analysis to the California tax
by first concluding that the legal incidence of the tax was not
on the Federal Government or its property.

The only remaining

question then was whether the tax was discriminatory with
respect to the federal function, that is, whether its incidence
was so limited as to destroy the political checking function
first noticed in M'Culloch.

The Court concluded that the tax

was not discriminatory because it was equivalent to the
property tax imposed on owners of non-exempt property and
passed on to them by their lessees.

"Consequently, the

appellants who rent from the Forest Service are no worse off
under California tax laws than those who work for private
employers and rent houses in the private sector."

Id. at 465.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a similar
analysis of the economic incidence of a tax on the use of taxexempt property owned by the United States in United States v.
City of ·netroit, 355

u.s.

466 (1958).

Defining the "discrimination" proscribed by the
Supremacy Clause in terms of the political check on oprressive
taxation by a State seems sensible to me.

It establishes a

rather generous constitutional limitation on State taxation

affecting the Federal Government, and one that does not depend
on a weighing by the Court in each case of whether the tax in
question is so high that it actually burdens the functions of
the Federal Government.

At the same time, it is a limitation

that should prevent State tax burdens so heavy as to impair the
operation of federal law, and that, in the most general terms,
is the purpose of the Supremacy Clause.

Within the limitation

so established, it continues to be open to Congress to further
immunize the Federal Government and those dealing with it from
State taxation.

City · of · oetroit · v~

Murray · corp~,

355

u.s.

489,

495 (1958).
I also think that the Court misapplied its standard of
discrimination in the Fresno case.

Instead of sticking with

the idea of "discrimination" defined in terms of the political
check on oppressive taxation, the Court slipped over into a
kind of equal protection analysis of discriminatory effect.

It

established that all persons who rented homes in California
were subiect (directly or indirectly)
burden.

That was probably true.

to roughly the same tax

But the fact that those who

rent from the federal government and those who rent from
private landlords end up with (roughly) the same rent bill
because of two · different · taxes does not show that there is any
effective political check on the tax levied on those renting
from the federal government.

Presumably, the private renters

would prefer to see that tax raised, while their own (indirect)

tax remained the same or was lowered, so long as the overall
revenue needs of the county were satisfied.
What the Court should have examined in Fresno was the
incidence of the use tax that the federal employees paid.

In

fact, the California statute authorized the imposition of the
use tax on all possessory interests in improvements on taxexempt land; accordingly, all persons with such interests, and
not just those with such interests related to Federal land,
were subject to the tax.

If this larger group proved large

enough to provide a significant check on oppressive imposition
of the use tax on federal employees, then the discrimination
test of the Supremacy Clause should have been held to be
satisfied.

Thus, in United

States · v~

City of Detroit, supra,

the Court noted not only the equivalent economic burden on
owners of private property and users of federally owned
property.

It also noted that "the [use] tax applies to every

private party who uses exempt property in Michigan in
connection with a business conducted for private gain.

Under

Michigan law this means persons who use property owned by the
Federal Government, the State, its political subdivisions,
churches, charitable organizations, and a great host of other
entities."

Id;, 355

u.s.

at 473.

In the present case the political subdivisions of the
State, and their taxpayer-voters, would seem to me to provide a
strong and effective check on oppressive use of the gross

receipts tax against the Federal Government and those
contractors who do business with it.

But there is no doubt

that if gross receipts from private contracts were also subject
to the tax, another group of taxpayer-voters, private
purchasers of contractors' services, would also be concerned
with the rate at which the gross receipts tax is levied.

As I

see it, the only question is whether the Act is
unconstitutional because it fails to include as strong a
political check on abusive taxation as it might have done.
Court was willing to say in

Fr~sno

The

that a group of taxpayers

subject (indirectly) to a different tax (private tenants
subject to (passed on) property taxes on their landlords) would
guard adequately against abuse of the use tax imposed on
renters of federally owned homes.

I think that the interests

of the State's subdivisions and their taxpayer-voters in this
case will provide at least as strong a check on the use of the
gross receipts tax.
B.

Th~ · Equal · prot~ction · Issu~

The DC did not consider the Equal Protection claim, as
noted above.

In his Brief, the SG concentrates his attention

on the decisions of this Court dealing with the Supremacy
Clause immunity of the Federal Government.

Since the issue was

not considered below, and is not pressed in this Court, I see
no need for the Court to consider it now.
It is difficult even to find a clear formulation of

•

the equal protection claim.

The appellant treats the issue in

its Brief, pp. 18-22, and formulates the question as the
acceptability of the distinction drawn between public
contractors and private contractors, as if all contractors were
permanently classified as one or the other.

But as I have

noted at the head of this memorandum, the tax is levied on the
receipts from public contracts.

Contractors are free to engage

in both public and private contracts, or to engage in only
private contracts if they wish not to pay the tax.

Further,

the tax is a potential cost for every bidder on any public
contract, so all potential public contractors are subject to
the same tax cost.

In addition, since the SG's Supremacy

Clause argument rests on the assumption that the tax is shifted
from the contractor to the purchaser, I do not see how he could
argue that contractors who pay the gross receipts tax are
disadvantaged.
The only perceptible differential impact of the tax is
between public and private purchasers of contractors' services.
Any conclusion that there is a significant difference in this
regard would have to rest on the assumption that the gross
receipts tax is shifted from the contractor to the purchaser of
his services.
assumption.

There is no support in the record for such an
Further, I think it would be a bad idea to

entertain equal protection claims based on the actual rather
than legal incidence of a tax.

Finally, I think that even if

the actual incidence of the tax is on the public bodies paying
for the construction, and even if equal protection claims can
be based on actual economic incidence rather than legal
incidence, the discrimination can be justified in this case.
The gross receipts tax is levied as part of a general statutory
plan for the licensing and regulation of contractors performing
public contracts.

This system is maintained for the benefit of

all public bodies making use of construction contracting
services within the State.

It seems reasonable to me to impose

a tax that is paid (indirectly) by those benefitting from the
maintenance of this licensing and regulatory system.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 17, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1134, Montana v. United States

Dear Thurgood,
My only problem with this opinion is the long paragraph beginning on page 21 discussing other "recognized exceptions to collateral estoppel." First, it strikes me that this
paragraph is _g..r. at ~ s. More importantly, there is substantial doubt whether
situations discussed are really
"recognized exceptions." For example, the first situation-when a defendant is forced to litigate an issue of exclusive
federal jurisdiction in state court -- is not a recognized
exception as far as I am aware. At best, it is an open
question. The only citation in support is a student Note in
the Harv. L. Rev. arguing for a change in current doctrine.
Other commentators have argued to the contrary. ~ Currie,
Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317
(1978).
Similarly, the second situation discussed -- a statutory right that presupposes determination of factual questions
in a federal forum -- is also unsettled. The authority cited
in footnote 11, the Gardner-Denver case, deals only with
arbitral awards which pose a far different question. Also
cited is another student piece in the Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
Finally, the footnote states that this Court has left open the
question of "the scope of preclusion with respect to § 1983
claims that could have been asserted in prior state court
proceedings : " Two dissenting opinions are cited.
In Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 497, however, the Court stated that
"[R]es judicata has been held to be fully applicable to a civil
rights action brought under § 1983." While this statement is
not a holding, the question might not really be so open, and at
the very least, this discussion should not be in a paragraph
labeled "recognized exceptions" to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.

- 2 The rest of the paragraph deals with England.
In the
briefs, Montana argued that the government was barred from
relitigating by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and England
abstention. By deciding to preclude relitigation of the
dispute because of collateral estoppel, there is no need to
reach the England question.
Placing the discussion of England
under "recognized exceptions" to collateral estoppel seems to
me to confuse two distinct issues. England simply does not involve collateral estoppel.
In short, I would hope that you might give favorable
consideration to the possibility of deleting this entire paragraph and its accompanying footnotes.
If the paragraph is deleted, I shall gladly join the opinion.
Sincerely yours,
Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

()

() .

\. :;;.,

/
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BENCH .MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 77-1134,

Montana · v; · united · states

Justice Marshall's opinion contains a thorough
discussion of this case and the issues presented.

My only

reservations concern Part III.C, beqinning at p. 20.
The discussion of Moser at pp. 20-21 sets forth the
principle that in "successive actions involving unrelated
subject matter," decisions of law in earlier cases may not be
preclusive on a party to the earlier action.

By stressing the

distinction between related and unrelated demands in the
successive actions, the opinion appears to be concerned with
situations in which a broad holdinq on some question of law in
one action might be urged as precluding the losing party from
securinq reexamination of that holding in a subsequent action
involving different facts.

Such preclusion might be

unwarranted, the opinion seems to imply, if the new factual

2.

situation raises considerations that could not have been
forseen at the time of the first action.
This part of the opinion is oblique, at best.

But the

result it arques for is familiar -- limitinq previous rulinqs

------~-------~------------------------

of law narrowly to the facts of the prior case, even though in

~

~-----------------------inion those rules may have been announced

the prio
terms.

in broad

This "overrulinq without overrulinq" is an accepted

______...,

feature of constitutional adjudication.

I am not sure that it

makes much sense to discuss it in terms of the Moser case,
which did not involve constitutional litiqation, but I think
the underlyinq principle and practice are clear enouqh to
survive this bit of confusion.
Justice Stewart's letter of January 17, 1979, to

--------"'-

Justice Marshall raises several qood points.

The first and

-------~~-----------second sentences of
the paraqraph beqinninq on p. 21 of the
opinion, and the footnotes to those sentences, are
overstatements of the law of collateral estoppel on the points /
mentioned.

I think it would be well to wait and see how

Justice Marshall responds to Justice Stewart's suqqestions.
I disagree with Justice Stewart about the Enqland
case.

The doctrine of that case is simply an application of

the general doctrine of preclusion irl the context of federal
court abstention.

A party should not be precluded by a state

____________

....
court judgment unless
he has submitted_..._
freely to the state
~

~

court the issue determined by it.

This rule of Enqlanrl should

I

3.

apply equally whether the preclusion suggested is res · jn,dicatd.
(same parties) or collateral estoppel (as in this case, a party
in federal court that controlled one side of the litigation in
the state court).

Since the parties arqued extensively about

the effect of England in this case, I think Justice Marshall
properly refers to the case in his opinion.

~ltprtnu

(!fourt of tqt ~nittb .;§tatts
'Dasltittgton, ~. "f. 2ll~J~~

CHAMI!IERS OF'

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 18, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1134 - Montana v. United States

Dear Potter:
I am willing to delete the first two sentences and
accompanying footnotes of the first full paragraph on
p. 21 of United States v. Montana, beginning "We note
also .••. " Although as a review of the law journal
articles cited in fns. 10 and 11 will reflect, there is
certainly case law authority for the propositions
advanced in text, I agree that it is unnecessary to
address the points in this opinion.
I am, however, reluctant to dispense with a
discussion of England v. Medical Examiners. Since both
the state and Government strenuously argued England, and
the dissent below partially relied on it, our reference
is scarcely gratuitous.
And while it is true that
England involved res judicata, I see nothing in . the
reasoning of the opinion to suggest that a different
result would obtain where collateral estoppel was
applicable.
If a party forced into state court could not
be precluded under res judicata from litigating the federal
claims that he reserved, a fortiori, a controlling nonparty could not be foreclosed under the same circumstances.
At the very least, we should be careful to dispel any
inference to the contrary, which is how fn. 12 is presently
phrased.
As to the discussion on the top of p. 23, I think it
beyond argument that unfairness or inadequacy of prior
procedures constitutes a recognized exception to collateral
estoppel. Application of that doctrine has always been

1/y?t

)'0/j 7/f

_:z-

- 2 justified on the theory that a party has had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate his claims in a prior
proceeding, and I think its important to note in text
that the Government does not dispute the fairness of
its previous opportunity in this case.
Accordingly, I will rewrite the first full paragraph
beginning on p. 21 to read:
"Nor does this case implicate the right
of a litigant who has 'properly invoked the
jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to
consider federal constitutional claims,' and
who is then 'compelled, without his consent . .
• , to accept a state court's determination of
those claims.' England v. Medical Examiners,
375 u.s. 411, 415 (.1964) (footnote omitted)."
The text of the remainder of pages 22-23 will follow.
Footnotes 10 and 11 of the first draft will be deleted,
and fns. 12 and 13 renumbered to reflect the deletion.
Sincerely,

ftl
T.ML

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference

.inpumt Qf.tntrl of tlft 'J!hrittb ,j~s

';Was!p:ngton. ~. (!f.

2.(J~Jl·2

CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE POTTER STEWAR T

Re:

January 18, 1979

No. 77-1134 - Montana v. United States

Dear Thurgood :
Thanks for your letter of today, and for your willingness to accommodate my views. The chanv
gopose
are entirely satisfactory, and I am glad t
join yo r
opinion for the Court as so modified.
Sincerely yours,

/

Mr. Justice Marshal l
Copies to the Conferenc e

·.

<!f01trl o-f t4t ~ltili~ ~taf.tg
'J.tIUJ ~tltg:fO'lt, ~. <!f. 2LJ§J!-~

.:§ltprtutt

CHAMBERS OF"

January 18, 1979

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

.
Re:

No. 77-1134

-

\

Montana v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your circulation of January 17 as
modified by your letter of today to Potter.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Mar shall
cc:

The Conferenc e

.

•

~uprmtt

<!Jll'Url .of tJrt ~ .i)bdtg

JragJritt.gfutt. !B. <If.

2.(]'~)!,

CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 18, 1979

Re:

77-1134 - Montana v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
',

Please join me.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

.

'

/At

The

Chie~ut/£
e an

Mr. Just
Mr. Just ce

a art
J4r. Justice White
Ur. Justice Blackmun

~

• Justice Powell
• Justice Rehnquist
. Justice Stevens

~----

!rom~

Mr. Justice Marshall

Circulated:------Recirculated: ---.....---1 Jf.\N 1979
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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77-1134

State of Montana et a!..
Appellants,
On Appeal from the United States
District Court for the District of
v.
Montana.
United States.
[February -, 1979]
MR.

JusTICE

MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the

Court. ~~

The State of Montana imposes a one percent gross receipts ~
tax upon contractors of public. but not private. construction
-~ _ _ _
I
11
projec . Montana Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-3505 (Supp. 1975). ~~
1

1

'4-~{505

"eac~r~ublic

(5), :\fontalla Hev.

~hall

Code~

Ann. (Supp. 197i) proYide,c

/A...A-

i~~

contractor
pay to the state an additional licrn:-;e fee
a sum equal to one prr crnt (1 % ) of the gro~:; receiptti from public~ ~
contracts during thr incomr ~·ra r for which the licen~e i~ issurd . . . ."
~f

The Act defines public ron tractors to includr:

m thr fcrm of

·.
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A public contractor may credit against the gross receipts tax
its paymeuts of personal property. corporate income, and
individual income taxes.~ Any remaining gross receipts liability is customarily passed on in the form of incrPased
construction costs to the governmental unit financing the
project.a At issue in this appeal is whether a prior judgment
by the Montana Supreme Court upholding the tax precludes
the United fltates from contesting its constitutionality and if
not, whether the tax -discriminates against the Federal Government in violation of the l::iupremacy Clause.

I
In 1971, Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., the contractor on a federal
dam project in Montana: brought suit in state court contend..:
ing that the Montana gross receipts tax unconstitutionally
discriminated against the Pnited States and the companies
with which it dealt. The litigation waE directed and financed
by the United States. Less than a month after the state suit
was filed, the Government initiated this challenge to the
constitutionality of the tax in the trnited States District
Court for the District of Montana. On stipulation by the
parties, the instaut case was continued pending resolution of
the state-court litigation.
·
That litigation concluded in a unanimous decision by the
Montana Supreme Court sustaining the tax. Peter Kiewit
Sons' Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 505
P. 2d 102 (1973) (Kiewit !). · The court found the distinc~
tion between public and private contractors consistent with
the mandates of the Supremacy and Equal Protection Clauses.
recript:;' shall not inrlude ra~h di.:<rounts allowrd and takPn on :sale::: and
:sales refund~:< , eitht>r in ca,;h or h~· crt>dit, uncol!ertihlt> aecount;,; writtt>n utf
from time to timt>, or paymPnt::: rt>criv!'d in final liquidation of a<"count:;
includC'd in the gro~~ rrrcipt.• of nny pn'viou:< return made by tlw p!'rson."
1rl., § 84-:~50 1 (3) .
2 Set• :\lantana Rev. Codt>~ Ann.,§§ 84-351:) and 8-t-:).')l·t
(Supp. 1977),
SSetl App. 98-10~ ; 112-111,16-1.

"I

1
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ld., at 149-154, 505 P. 2u. at 108-110. The contractor subsequently filed a ~otice of Appeal to this Court. but abandoned
its request for rf'viE:'w at the direction of the Solicitor General.
App. to Juris. Statement 86-87. It then instituted a second
action in stat£> court serking a refund for certain tax payments
different from those involvE:'d in Kiewit I. On dE:'termining
that the contractor's second legal claim was. in all material
respects, identicaJ to its first. the Montana ~upreme C'ourt
invokt:-d the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata
to affirm the dismissal of the complaint. Peter Kiewit So'lls'
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 166 Mont. 260, 531 P. 2d 1327
( 1975) (Kiewit II ).
After the decision in Kiewit II, a three-judge District Court
heard the instant case on the merits. In a divided opinion ,
the court concluded that the United States was not boum.l by
the Kiewit I decision. and struck dowu the tax as violative of
the Supremacy Clause. 437 F. Supp. 354 (Mont. 1977).
The majority began with the premise that the Supremacy
Clause immunizes the Federal Govemment Hot oHly from
direct taxation by the States, but also from indirect taxation
that operates to discriminate against the Government or those
with whom it transacts business. ld., at 359. See United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466. 473 (1958); Phillips
Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 F S.
376, 387 (1960). Because no private contractors were subject
to the Montana gross receipts tax. the court reasoned that
the statute impermissibly singled out the Federal Government and those with whom it dealt for disparate treatment.
That the tax applied to state and municipal as well as
federal contractors rlid not, in the majority's view. negate
the statute's discriminatory character. For although contractors on state projects might pass on the amount of
their tax liability to the ~tate in the form of higher construction costs. Montana would n•coup its additional expenditure
through the revenue that the tax generated. By contrast,
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wh<'n f0deral contractors shifted the burden of their increased
costs to the Fnited States. it would receive no such offsetting
revenues. Accordingly. the court concluded that the statut(l
encroached upon tlw immunity from discriminatory taxation
enjoyed by the Federal Government under the Supremacy
Clause. 437 F . Supp .. at 3;")8-350. OnP judge argued in
dissent both that the rnited States was estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the tax and that the statutory
schem<>. b<:'cause it Pncompassed receipts of municipal and
state as well as federal contractors. was not discriminatory
within the meauing of Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas In~
dependent School Dist., supra. 437 F. Supp., at 365- 366
(Kilkenny, J.. dissenting).
8
'\Ve noted probable jurisdiction. 436 U. S. 91G (19i)),
Because we find that the constitutional question presented by
this appeal was determined adversely to the rnited States
in a prior state proceeding. we reverse on grounds of collateral
estoppel without reaching the merits.

II
A fundamental precPpt of common-law adjudication. embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res
judicata, is that a "right. question or fact distinctly put in
issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed iu a subsequent suit between
the same parties or their privies . . . . '' Southern Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1. 48-49 (1897). Fnder res
judicata, a final .i udgment on the merits bars further claims
by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351. 352 (1877); Lawlor
v . .Yational Screen Service Corp., 349 U . S. 32:2. 3:26 ( 1955);
1B J. Moore. Federal Practice 1f 0.405 [ 1 J. at 621-6:24 (2d eel.
H.l74); Restatement (Second) of Judgments ~ 47 (Tent. Draft
No.1. March 28. Hl73) (merger); id., ~48 (bar). Under
collateral estoppel. once an issue is actually and necessarily
'determined by a court of competent jurisdiction , that dctc•r-

77-1134-0PI~IO~
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mination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different
cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.
Parkkme Hosiery v. Shore, U. S. - , n. 5; Scott.
Collaterai Estoppel by Judgment. 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1. 2-3
(1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments ~ 68 (Tent.
Draft No. 4. Apr. 15. H)77) (issue preclusion). Application
of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which civil
courts havf been established. the conclusive resolution of
disputes \Vithin tl-lrir jurisdictions. Southern Pacific Railroad,
supra, at 49; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 r. S.
294. 299 (1917) . To preclude parties from contesting matters
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation
attending multiple lawsuits. conserves judicial resources. anti
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.'
These interests are similarly implicated when nonparties
assume control over litigation in which they have a direct
financial or proprietary interest and then seek to redetermine
issues previously resolved." As this Court observed in Soulfront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 F R. 475. 486--487
(1910) , the persons for whose benefit and at whose direction
a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be "strangers
to the cause. . . . [O]ne who prosecutes or defends a suit in
4 SE-e Hazard, He;: X ova in Res Judicata, 44 ~ . Calif. L. Hrv. 1036,
1042-104;3 (1971) ; Vr~tal, Pn•clu sion / He~ .Tudicat;t \'ariahlr:; : Adjudicating Bodieo, 54 Georgt-town L. .1. 857, 1-158 {19u6); DrvPlotJmPnt::; in the
Law-He" Judicata, ti5 Harv . L. HeY . S18, ~::!0 (Hl.52) .
~Although thl, trrm .. privi r~" ha ~ brcn u~ed ou ol'ca ~ iou to deuominatP
nonparties who control litigation, ~PP, e. g.. Merriam v. ::iaaljil'ld. 241 U. S.
22, 2i (1916); l{p:;tatl'tnl'llt of .lud~m e nt,.: §I':~ . (·ouuurnt a (1\.!~2). thi,;
usage hns bt:'Pn crit icizrd a,; conclu~ory and anal~·ticall~· lllll:'OIIud . 1H
1\Joort:', Fedrral Pr:u:ttr<' ~j OAll , pp . 155:3 (~d l'd . HJ74): d . DPvPlopmPnts, supra. fi5 Harv . L. Ht-v ., at. ~5u . Thl' IIOII1PIH:latur<> has bf'l:'n
ahaudonl'd in tlw :tppi!rahl(• "l'rtioll of thr Srt'ond Edition of thr nr:;tatf''mPnt. Sr<·, HP~tateml'nt (~t><"ond) of .Judgment,.: § l'>:i (T<•nt . Draft Xo . '!,
Apr. 1~, 19(.)),
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the name of another to establish and protect his own right. or
who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid
of some interest of his ow11 . . . is as much bound . . . as he
would be if he had beeu a party to the record." See Schnell
v. Peter Eckrich & Sons , Inc. , 365 l'" . .S. 260, 262 n. 4 ( Hl61);
cf. Zenith Radio Corp. V. Hazelti11e Research, Inc. , 39:5 e. S.
100, 111 (Hl69). Preclusion of such nonparties falls under ~
the rubric of collateral estoppel rather than res· judicata
because the latter doctrine presupposes identity between causes
of action. And the cause of action which a nonparty has
vicariously asserted differs by definition from that which he
subsf'quently seeks to litigate in his own right. See Merriam
v. Saalfi.eld, 241 C'. 8. 22. 29 (1916); Restatement (Second)of Judgments, ~ 83, Comment b, p. 51 (Tent. Draft Xo. 2.
Apr. 15. 1975); lB Moore. supra, ~ 0.411 [6]. at 1553- 1554;
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
818. 862 (1952).
That the United States exercised control over the Kiewit I
litigation is not in dispute. 'The Government has stipulated
that it:

"(1) required the Kieurit /la·wsuit to be filed;
"(2) reviewed and approved the complaint;
"(3) pa.id the attomeys' fees and costs;
"( 4) directed the appeal from state district court to
the Montana Supreme Court;
"(5) appeared and submitted a brief as amicus in the
Montana Supreme Court;
" ( 6) directed the filing of a ~ otice of Appeal to this
Court; and
"(7) effectuated Kiewit's abandonme11t of that appeal
on advice of the Solicitor General." App. to Juris. State-ment, 86- 87.
Thus, although not a party, the United States plainly had a
sufficient "laboring oar'' in the conduct of the state-court
litigation to actuate principles of estoppel. Drummond v.

,,~
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United States, 324 lT. S. 316, 318 ( Hl45). See Schn'3ll v.
Peter Eckrich & Sons, supra, at 262 n. 4; Souffront v. Compagnie des Suceries, supra, at 486-487; Watts v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 27 X. Y. 2d 270, 277-278 , 265 N. E. 2d 739 , 743-744
(1970).

III
To determine the appropriate application of collateral estoppel in the instant case necessitates three further inquiries:
first, whether the issues presented by this litigation are iu
substance the same as those resolved against the United
States in Kiewit I; second. whether controlling facts or legal
principles have changed significantly since the state-court
judgment; and finally. whether other special circumstances
warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion.

A
A review of the record in Kiewit I dispels auy doubt that
the plaiutiff there raised and the Montana Supreme Court
there decided the precise constitutional claim that the "United
States advances here. In its complaint in Kiewit I, the contractor allf)ged that the gross receipts tax and regulations
promulgated thereumler were unconstitutional because they.
inter alia:
"(a) illegally discriminate against the Plaintiff. the
United States. and its agencies and instrumentalities, and
those with whom the United States does business. and
deny them due process of law and the equal protection of
the laws;
"(b) illegally impose a tax 011 Plaintiff which is not
uniform upon the same class of subjects;
"(c) illegally and improperly interfere with the Federal
Govemment's power to select contractors and schedule
construction and ... conflict vvith Federal law and policy
regulating Federal procurement;
"(d) illegally violate the immunity of the Federal Gov-

77-1134-0PIXION
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ernment and its instruments (including Plaintiff) from
state control in the performance of their functions; [and}

"(f) illf' gally frustrat<' the Federal poliey of selecting tlw
lowest possible bidtkr . . . ." App. 37.
The Montana Court rejected those contentions on thf' t1H•ory
that:
"The federal gpvemmen t is being treated in the samemanner as the state of Montana treats itself and its subdivisions or municipalities. The only discrimination the
federal government can claim is that private contractors
are not paying the same tax as public contractors. However, according to [Phillips Chemical Co. v. DuntM
School Dist., 361 F S. 376 (l!:l60) and Alvses Lake
Homes v. Grant County, 365 F. S. 744 (19tH) l ... all
[that is] requin•d is that the state does not give itself
special treatment ovE'r that received by the federal government. The Act involved here treats th e fedE'ral government in the same manner as it treats those who deal
with any part of the state government.' ' Kiew·it I , 161
Mont.. at 152. 505 P. 2cl. at 109.
No different constitutional challenge · is at issue in this
litigation . Indeed. the l:'nited States' amended complaint
tracks almost verbatim the language of the plaintiff's in
Kiewit I in alleging that the Montana tax provisions:

"(1) illegally discriminate against the plaintiff. United
States. and its agencies and instrumentalities. and those
with \Vhom the rnited States does business in violation
of the Supremacy Clause. Article VI. Clause 2. and the
Fourteenth Amendment;
"{2) illegally impose a tax on plaintiff's contractors and
subcontractors which is not uniform upon the same class
of subjects in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
·"{3) illegally fore<' the L"nited States of America to pay·
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more for its construction than does a private party or
corporation in violation of the Supremacy Clause. Art.
VI, Cl. 2; [and]
"(5) ... illegally interferes with the Federal Government's free choice to choose its contractors and fruEtrates
the policy of choosing the lowest bidder in violation of
federal procurement law and the tiupremacy Clause. Art.
IV, Cl. 2." App. 67.
Thus. the "question expressly and definitely presented in
this suit is the same as that definitely and actually litigated
and adjudged '' adversely to the Government in state court.
United States v. iVI oser, 266 r. S. 236. 242 ( 1924). Absent
significant changes in controlling facts or legal principles
since Kiewit I, or other special circumstances. the Montana
Supreme Court's resolution of these issues is concluEive here.

B
Relying on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 F S. 591 ( 1948).
the United States argueE that collateral eEtoppel extends only
to contexts in which "the controlling facts and applicable
legal ruleEJ remain unchanged." I d., at 600. In the Government's view , factual stasis is missing here because the contract at issue in Kiewit I contained a critical provision which
the contracts involved in the imtant litigation do not.
Under its contract with the Army Corps of Engineers.
Kiewit was unable to take advantage of the credit provisions
of the gross receipts tax. 11 In 1971. however. the 'C'nited
Clau::e 58 of the contract enumerated the credit provision:-: of the
::;tatute and provided that: " [t]he Contractor. and, in inrn, tlw
subcentractors will not ta ke advantage of the::;£' credits." Peter Kieu·it
and Sons' Co. v. State Board of Equalization (Kiewit I), ltil :\font. HO,
145-146, sos P. 2d 102. 10u (197:n .
The record doPS uot rdlf'rt the reason for th£' Governm:-nt's policy.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. :{5 .
6
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StatPs altPrccl its policy and has since required Montana
contractors to seek all available refunds ami credits. See
United States v. 1\tf ontana, 437 F. Supp .. at 3.54; App. 91. As
the Govemment reads the Kiewit I decision. the Montaua
Supr('me Court proceeded on th~ assumption that if Kiewit
had beeu able to avail itself of the offsetting income and
property tax credits. there might have been a "total washout"
of its gross receipts tax liability. 161 Mont .. at 145. 505 P.
2d. at 106. Thus. according to the Govemnwnt. the holding
of KieH•it I \Vas that the Montaua statute did not discriminate
against the United States under circumstancC's where. but for
the Federal Government's own contractual arrangement. the
tax might have had no financial impact. Brief of the Fnited
States. 35-36. Because the uncontroverted evidence in this
case establish('s that aftrr taking all credits available. federal
contractors are still subject to a gross revenue tax of one-half
of one percent. App. to .Juris. ~tatement 90. the Government.
submits that the factual premise of the K ieurit I holding is
absent here.
We disagree. 7 It is. of course. true that changes ill facts
essential to a judgment will render collateral estoppel inapplicable in a subsequent actiou raising the same issues. ~ee.
e. g., United States v. Certain Land at lrvi'II(J Place & 16th
Street, 415 F. 2d 265, 269 (CA2 1969); Metcalf v. Cornmis7

A threshold difficulty with the Government':; argument is that the
record doe,: not support its assertion that. contr11ctual provision:: barring·
contrnctors from taking credits are "no longer applicable in the contracts
involved in this litigation." Brirf for Unitetl States 16. SeP also Tr. of
Oral Arg. :n. Thr \fontana gross receipts statute wa~ enacted in 1967,
and t.he Government ha,: not limited itt:: rP4uest for rrlirf to gross receipt~
taxet:' paid aftrr 1971 wlwn the contractual provisions involvt•d in Kieu:it I
wrrp discontinuf:'d. Set• pp. ~. supra. To thP contrary, thf:' Government's amendpd complnint in the instant ca,.:e seeks a refund of all tax
payrnrnts, le~s credit::;, made undl'r the ;\.fontana. statute. App. til\-6!:l.
Thus, thf:'. Goverum!'nt ·~ coutrntion concerning factual changp:; dors not
justify the District Court's rPfu:;al to invoke •rstopr~el with rr.spf'rt to the_·
rre-19i.') eJaitn::< •.
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siouer, 343 F . 2d 66, 67-68 (CAl 1965); Alexander v. Commissioner, 224 F. 2d 788. 792-793 (CAS )/f5'5J; lB Moore,
supra, ~ 0.448. at 4232-4233. ~ 0.422 [ 4J. at 3412-3413. But
we do not cvnstrue the opinion in Kiewit I as predicated on
the factual assumption that the gross receipts tax would
cancel out if public contractors took all available refunds and
credits.
The Montana Supreme Court adverted to the washout
possibility when discussing the origin of the gross receipts tax
as a revenue-enforcing rather than revenue-generating measure. Prior to the E-nactment of the statute. certain public
contractors had evaded assessment of local property taxes by
shifting equipment from one construction site to another. and
by filing corporate or personal income tax retums that did not ·
fairly reflect the amount of profit attributable to construction
projects within the State. 161 Mont.. at 143-145. 505 P. 2d.
at 104-105. 8 In establishing a flat percentage tax 011 gross
receipts. with credits available for income and property tax
payments. the Montana Legislature sought to remove any
incentive for contractors to dissemble about the location of
taxable equipment and the source of taxable reveuues. Under
the statutory scheme. a coutractor who .paid a substantial
amount of property or income taxes might. by claiming those
payments as credits. effectively cancel out his gross receipts
tax liability. !d., at 145 ..j05 P. 2d. at 105. Iu practice, the
court noted in Kiewit/, the statute hac! not resulted in a total
offset of the 1 ~ gross receipts payments in part because of
provisions such as those in federal contracts. Ibid. , 505 P.
2d , at 106. Significantly. however. the court did not rely on
the potential absence of tax liability in its analysis of Kiewit's
constitutional challenge. Indeed, it did not even allude tu
the washout potential in the course of that discussion. !d.,
at 147- 154, 505 P. 2d. at 100-110. It focused rather on the
8 Appan•tnl.'· th1• prob~em haJ not ari"l'll to anr apprrl'i11hlt> f'xtrnt witlr.
l_lrivatt• contractor>'. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-(i...
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rationality of the classification between public and private
contractors. and 011 the parity of treatment betweeu the
United States and other public contractors. Ibid.
Our conclusion that tlw washout potential of the tax was
not of controlling significance in K ieurit I is further reinforced
by the Montana Supreme Court's holding in Kiewit II.
There, the contractor alleged that its gross receipts tax liability had exceeded its property and income tax credits. and
argued that "the -ouly basis" for the decision iu Kiewit I was
that "if the Act were properly enforced it would result in a
'washout.' '' Kiewit II, 166 Mont .. at 262. 531 P. 2d. at 1328.
The Montana Supreme Court rejected that reading of Kie·urit
I ar. "much too narro[w]. '' /d., at 263. 531 P. 2d. at 1329.
That the offset possibility had not materialized for Kiewit
was. in the court's view, a fact too "inconsequeutial" to
warrant relitigation of the statute 's constitutionality. !d. ,
at 264, 531 P. 2d. at 132H. So too here. we cannot view the
absence of a total washout as altering facts essential to the
judgment in Ki3wit I.
Thus. unless there have been major changes in the law
governing intergovernmeutal tax immunity since Kiewit I ,
the Government's reliance on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U. S. 591. is misplaced. Sunnen involved the tax status of
certain income generated by a license agreemeut during a
particular tax period. Although previous litigatiou had settled the status of income from the same agreement during
earlier tax years. the Court declined to give collateral estoppel
effect to the prior judgment because there had been a significant "chauge in the legal climate." I d. , at 606. Fnderlying
the Sunnen decision was a concem that modifications in
"controlling legal principles." id., at 59~) . could render a.
previous determinatio11 inconsistent with prevailing doctrine,
and that
"[i]f such a determination is then perpetuated each succeeding year as to the taxpayer involved in the original
litigation, he is accorded a tax treatment ditl('rent from•
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that given to other taxpayers of the same class. As a
result, there are inequalities in the administration of the
revenue laws. discriminatory distinctions in tax liability.
and a fertile basis for litigious confusion. [Collateral
estoppel] is not meant to create vested rights in decisions
that have become obsolete or erroneous with time. thereby
causing inequities among taxpayers." Ibid. (citations
omitted).
No such considerations obtain here. The Government does
not contend and the District Court did not find that a change
in controlling legal principles had occurred between Kiewit I
and the instant suit. That the Government's amended complaint in this action replicates in substance the legal argument
advanced by the contractor's complaint in Kiewit I further
suggests the absence of any major doctrinal shifts since the
Montana Supreme Court's decision. 0
Because the factual and legal context in which the issues
of this case arise has not materially altered since Kiewit I,
normal rules of preclusion should operate to relieve the parties
of "redundant litigation [over] the identical question of the
statute's application to the taxpayer's status." Tait v. U' estern Maryland R . Co ., 289 r. S. 620. 624 (1933). See United
States v. Russel Manufacturing Co., 349 F. 2d 13. 18-19
(CA2 1965).

c

The sole remaining question is whether the particular
circumstances of this case justify an exception to general
principles of estoppel. Of possible relevance is the exception
which obtains for "unmixed questions of law" in successive
actions involving substantially unrelated claims. United
States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236. 242 (1924) . As we recognized
in Moser:
"Where. for example. a court in deciding a case has

7-r
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enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequt'nt
action upon a differe·n t demand arr not estopped from
insisting that the law is otherwise. merely because the
parti{'s are the same in both cases. But a fact, question
or right distinctly adjudged in the origiual action cannot
be disputed in a subsequent action. even though the
determination was reached upon an . erroneous view or by
an erroneous application of the law." Ibid. (emphasis
added).
Thus, when issues of law arise in successive actions involving
unrelated subject matter. preclusion may be inappropriate.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments ~ 68.1. Reporter's
Note. at 43-44 (Tent. Draft Xo . 4. Apr. 15. 1973); 1B Moore,
supra, 1[ 0.448. at 4235; Scott. 56 Harv. L. Rev .. supra, at 10.
This exception is of particular importance in constitutional
adjudication. rnreftective invocation of collateral estoppel
against parties with an ongoing interest in constitutional issues
could freeze doctrine in areas of the law where responsiveness
to changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical. To
be sure. the scope of the Moser exception may be difficult to
delineate. particularly whPre there is partial congruence in
the subject mattt=>r of successive disputes. But the instant
case poses no such conceptual difficulties. Rather. as the
preceeding discussio11 indicates. the legal "demands" of this
litigation are closely a1igned in time and subject matter to
those in Kiewit I.
Nor does this case implicate the right of a litigant who
has "properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District
Court to consider federal constitutional claims." and who is
then "compelled. without his const>nt . . . . to accept a state
court's determination of those claims.'' England v. Medical
Examiners, 375 F. S. 411. 415 (1064) (footnote omittPtl). As
we held in Engla·nd. abstention doctrine may not S<'I'V<' as a
vehicle for depriving individuals of an otherwise cognizable
right to have federal courts make factual determinations rs-

77-1134-0PINION
MO~TANA

v. UXITED STATES

15

!entia} to the resolution of federal questions. ld., at 417.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 427 (1963). However
here, as in England, a party has "freely and without reservation submitte[d I his federal claims for decision by the state
courts ... and ha [ d l them decided there. . .. " E ngla:nd
v. Medical Examiners, supra , at 419. 111 Considerations of
comity as well as repose militate against redetermination of
issues in a federal forum at the behest of a plaintiff who has
chosen to litigate thPm in state court.
Finally. the Government has not alleged unfairness or
iuadequacy in the state procedures to which it voluntarily
submitted. 11 We must conclude therefore that it had a full
and fair opportunity to pn•ss its constitutional challenges 111

Kiewit I.
111 The C:ovrrnment ~rt·b to distinguish England on the ground that the
,., 14tc (' o: c tlllflt'lll r ' P~<>k•· to cij..;ting~~~fllmtf~-mHht•- grouud-+1~~-h~
l'ourt lwlow did not trchnicall~· abstain, but rathrr, at the Ilartip,.:' requrst, '~
continuc·d thr action "prnding rPsolution in the state Court.; of :\fontana .''
App. to .Juri,.:. StatPment -!~-50 . Furtlwr, in the Go\'ernmmt ';; virw . the
rule of England ari,.:t':< onl~· when a part!/ frrely submits hi:; f<'ucral t'laims
to adjudiration in :state court:; . HPcaust• tlw Unitrd States was not a.
party in Kiewit I . thr Govrrnnwnt submits that it i,- not bound by the
judgmt>nt in that cu~e. Brief of Fnit!'d States :34.
Wr ngrrr that. the Di,;trict Court's action is properly characterized ns
. -.. a rontinuunce and that re:; judicata . the doctrinr involwd in Eugland. is
/ t:.. -(, '~napj11~-tu·li~;ti;~~~~~:~.' · SePjlj~ s'Upra . But nPither point is
~ availing ht>rc ~incr wt- dispost· of thr ca~e on grouncL~ of collateral t>:;toppel,
which does apply to nonpartir:;, et>t• ibid .. and invoke England :;imply to
dispel tmy infert>ncr that thr ..:ame rt•;;ult would obtain if thr Federal
Govermnrnt httd b<•t•n fon·t·d into state <·onrt and had resrrwd its federai
rluim .
11 Rt•dt'H•rmination of i::;:;up,; is wmTitntrd if then· is rra::;on to doubt the
quality, rxtensivrn(•::;:;, or fairne:;s of procPdurr:; follow('(! in prior litigation.
See Hr:;httrmt-nt. (Second) of .Judgments § UIU (c) (Trnt . Draft. Xu . 4 ,
Apr. 15, 19ii) ; 1'\ot<•, The PrPdusiv·c Eft'rl't of Stat!' .JudgPm(•nts on
Sub;:equent. HJS:3 Actions, Ii-i Col. L . RP\'. 610, H-!0-65:~ (l~il\). C L
'Gibsu11 \'. Berryhill, -!11 ('. S. ,)ti4 (19/:{): 1'rai'llor v. Herlll'lllllez. ,l:l{
U.S. 4:l4, -!ti9--!70, am[ u. !5 (19/i) (Sn:n:Ns, .J .• dj,.:...:pnting).
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Accordingly, the Government is estopped from seeking a
contrary resolutiou of those issues here. The judgment of
the District Court is
Reversed.
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January 19? 1979

J . BR E NNAN, JR.

RE:

No. 77-1134 Montana v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

i'uprtmt <lfomt of tlft ~tb ~t~·
-aslfittg~ !). Of. 2ll.;t~~

I

CHAMeERS 01'"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 22, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1134 Montana v. United States

Dear r:rhurgood:
At Conference in this case I voted to reverse on the
merits of the constitutional issue, rather than col~teral
estoppel7 I realize that a majority preferred to decide the
issue of collateral estoppel, and you now have a Court for
your op1n1on. Within a couple of days I anticipate circulating
a short concurrence, not reaching the merits of the tax
immunity claim, but expressing the idea that if we are to
reverse on the basis of collateral estoppel (and I agree with
the result you reach), we ought to do so without as much
reliance on non-judicial materials as your opinion presently
contains. I hope to have the concurrence in your hands by
the latter part of this week.

Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

January 22, 1979

No. 77-1134 Montana v. United States
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your second draft of an opinion
for the Court in this case, circulated January 19.

·.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMISERS Of'"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 23, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1134-Montana v. United States

Dear Bill:
I have considered carefully your letters of
January 22.
I think it self~evident that citations
to the Restatement or scholarly articles are not
intended to bind us on issues not presented on this
appeal.
It seems to me unnecessary to state the
obvious.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc:

The Conference

.:§u:.prmu C!Jltlttf of t4t ~b ~taf:tg
~lUlfrittghrn. ~.

C!J.

2!l?J!.;l

'

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 1, 1979

Re:

77-1134 - Montana v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
I join.

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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